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Abstract  
This paper seeks to critically explore the construction of the Prevent 
counter-terrorism initiative within Social Work in the UK, and to consider 
the implications this has for Social Work. We begin by discussing the 
conceptualisation of ‘radicalisation’ in the work of Arun Kundnani, one of 
the leading critics of Prevent, pointing to the limitations of this as a means 
of grasping the nature of Salafi-jihadi groupings. We then move to a 
discussion of the development of counter-terrorism policy in the UK, 
looking at the way the 2015 legislative guidance has re-situated 
radicalisation from a ‘security’ issue to a ‘safeguarding’ issue. We see this 
as significant for the way it has facilitated Social Work being directly drawn 
into the orbit of Prevent, with radicalisation being re-constructed as part 
of Social Work’s concern with the vulnerability of children and young 
people involved in wider forms of exploitation, including Child Sexual 
Exploitation. We consider the reception of this shift within Social Work as 
well as look at evidence into how this is working in practice. We then 
consider challenges to this ‘safeguarding’ paradigm, which argue that this 
has involved Social Work being drawn into the ideological monitoring of 
Muslim communities: a ‘surveillance’ paradigm. We conclude by arguing 
for a critical defence of a safeguarding approach based on the harms which 
fundamentalist violence clearly represents to children and young people. 
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‘The ummah is watching while Iraq is being devoured. It’s not going to stop 
there, because it’s going to spill over into Syria and Allah knows where. In 
your own city, and in this country, many people have been arrested. You 
know if you talk about Guantánamo Bay and all this — there’s a 
Guantánamo Bay in this country. It’s an insult to Islam. Allah will revenge 
for himself, but the thing is, we cannot allow such things to happen and 
just watch.’ Anwar al-Awlaki - 2003 speech at the East London Mosque 
(New York Times, 2010) 
 
Introduction 
On 14th May 2010, Roshonara Choudhry, a 21-year-old student who had 
recently dropped out of her English and Communications degree 
programme at the prestigious King’s College in London, attempted to 
murder the Labour MP Stephen Timms with a knife at his constituency 
office in east London. Timms was very seriously wounded and Roshonara 
Choudhry was subsequently arrested, tried, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Justice Cooke stated the conclusion of her trial, ‘You are an 
intelligent young lady who has absorbed immoral ideas and wrong 
patterns of thinking and attitudes.’ (The Guardian, 2010a) Roshonara 
Choudhry claimed during the trial she had attacked Stephen Timms as a 
consequence of his role in voting for and supporting the 2003 Iraq war, but 
in police interviews undertaken after her arrest, she further explained her 
actions, stating:  
Choudhry: I wanted to be a martyr. 
Police Interviewers: Why’s that then? 
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Choudhry: ‘Cos, erm, that’s the best way to die. 
Police Interviewers: Who told you that? 
  Choudhry: It’s an Islamic teaching. 
When police asked her how she had come to adopt this understanding of 
Islam, she explained that it was through watching YouTube videos of Al-
Qaeda’s leading imams Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and Anwar al-Awlaki. She 
went on to explain to the police that: 
…when a Muslim land is attacked it becomes obligatory on every man, 
woman and child and even slave to go out and fight and defend the 
land and the Muslims and if they can’t handle like the forces they are 
facing, then it becomes obligatory on the people who live in … closest 
to that country and if those people refuse to fulfil their duty then it, 
then it becomes to the next closest people and the next closest until it 
goes all the way round the whole world and it’s obligatory on everyone 
to defend that land (Dodd and Topping, 2010).   
How did this young woman who, despite her poor background had a 
promising future ahead of her, become inspired toward the adoption of 
these fundamentalist views? Could her adoption of these views have been 
stopped through particular sorts of state and social welfare interventions? 
What are the implications of seeking to influence the way young Muslims 
think about their faith, especially in the context of increasing hostility 
toward Muslims in the West? The ‘radicalisation’ of Roshonara Choudhry 
took place almost a decade ago, but since her imprisonment, terrorist 
attacks and the recruitment of young people to join violent Salafi-jihadist 
groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and their affiliates has become a fact of life 
in the UK, as have the counter-terrorist measures undertaken to combat 
these. Both raise many questions about politics, ethics, and effectiveness. 
   
Feminist Dissent 
 
94 Cowden and Picken, Feminist Dissent (4), pp. 91-131 
Contest, the UK’s overarching counter-terrorism strategy, was initially 
established in 2003, with the 2011 revisions to this legislation developing 
the Prevent anti-radicalisation arm of the policy. Further changes in 2015 
were significant for the way they have drawn Social Work practice into the 
remit of this work and the focus of this paper is on the construction of 
Prevent within Social Work. Critics of these policies have characterised 
them as fanning the flames of anti-Muslim racism and ‘Islamaphobia’, 
cheered on by a right-wing press and new forms of anti-Muslim politics 
asserting their far-right agenda as an expression of ‘patriotism’ (Booth, 
2017). Cowden and Singh note that state policy toward Muslim 
communities itself seems to give very mixed messages: 
There is…a curious double movement where on one hand faith is held 
up by politicians, policy makers and religious leaders themselves as a 
great and positive force in the promotion of social cohesion. But as 
ongoing revelations of ‘jihadi brides’ and Asian youth travelling to Syria 
to join ISIS continue to hit the headlines, the prominence of Islam 
comes to be seen as evidence of how these communities are 
insufficiently ‘British’ and thus a source of social in-cohesion. In public 
life, Muslims now have to justify themselves, and it is this that results 
in what has been described as… ‘conditional or earned citizenship’. 
(Cowden & Singh, 2016: 4) 
Across Europe, neo-fascist groupings have returned to the streets in larger 
numbers than for several decades, re-animated with slogans about the 
‘Islamification’ of their respective countries (see Chakelian, 2017).  This is 
the context in which fundamentalist violence explodes into public 
consciousness, with images of beheadings, bombings of trains and buses 
and cars driven headlong toward pedestrians, entirely reinforcing this 
perception.  
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It is in this ‘bleak dynamic environment’ (Bhatt, 2017: 2) that counter-
terrorist strategies and policies like Prevent are situated. While this policy 
has raised justified concerns about the curtailment of civil liberties, the 
development of exclusionary conceptions of citizenship, and police 
surveillance of Muslim communities, a central issue we want to raise here 
is the silence amongst progressive left and human rights focused opinion 
about fundamentalist Islam and, particularly in the context of this article, 
Salafi-jihadism as both a political movement and a political ideology. 
Indeed, many of the left have sought to make common cause with Islamist 
groupings, such as CAGE, not least on the basis of their opposition to 
Prevent (see Cowden, 2016 and Bhatt, 2017)ii. This creates a situation 
where the most likely place to find serious critical scrutiny of Islamist 
groups – their funding, influence, and political links – is in the right-wing 
and xenophobic pages of newspapers like the Sunday Times and The Daily 
Telegraph. For progressives, it is as though to speak of these issues would 
be to give succour to anti-Muslim racism. But can’t the regressive nature 
of the fundamentalist agenda be challenged from an anti-racist 
perspective? Why is the recruitment of young people like Roshonara 
Choudhry into the way of thinking that led her to act as she did, not equally 
condemned by those on the Left? This leads us to the question which is 
the focus of this discussion – what is the place of Social Work, a profession 
which claims concerns about equality and human rights, within this 
debate?  Our argument is that it is crucial to mark out a space in which it 
is possible to talk about issues of racism and be alert to civil liberties 
concerns and, at the same time, to talk about the real political significance 
and the real danger represented by Salafi-jihadism.  This is important 
because the ideology and tactics of these groups need to be taken 
seriously – both as phenomena in their own right, but also for the harms 
these clearly represent. We see this as representing a major challenge for 
Social Work.   
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Within this article, we want to focus on a particular form of fundamentalist 
Islam known as Salafi-jihadism. There are two components to this term, 
important as Salafi-jihadism itself is a development within Salafism. 
Salafism is a Sunni Islamic revival movement whose adherents ‘claim to 
emulate “the pious predecessors” (the first three generations of Muslims 
from the 7th to 9th century) as closely and in as many spheres of life as 
possible’ (Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Religion, n.d.). There are 
many contributors to this school of thought. A key figure is Muhammed 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), a classically trained Arabian Sunni 
scholar. Wahhabi doctrine gained huge traction through political alliances 
between his clerical followers and the ruling royal House of Al-Saud and, 
when the modern state of Saudi Arabia formed in 1932, these ideas 
became central to the constitution of Saudi society. The vast petro-dollar 
wealth of the Saudi government has allowed this deeply conservative 
conception of Islam to be propagated throughout the world. Thomas 
Hegghammer has noted that, while there are diverse tendencies within 
Salafism, what generally defines this is a highly ‘literalist and more puritan 
approach to Islamic doctrine and practice’ (Hegghammer, 2009: 249). Even 
though the term has become associated with terrorism in the public mind, 
it is important to note that, while Salafism as a whole is highly dogmatic 
and sectarian, most Salafists are non-violent. Salafi-jihadists have 
separated themselves from the main body of Salafism in order to make the 
argument that the only way to realise God’s sovereignty on earth is to 
violently overturn the contemporary global political order.iii Nothing 
expresses this argument more clearly than the statement in Al Qaeda’s 
2003 Manifesto: ‘We believe that the ruler who does not rule in 
accordance with God’s revelation, as well as his supporters, are infidel 
apostates… Armed and violent rebellion against them is an individual duty 
on every Muslim’ (Maher, 2017: 11).  
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Central to the argument presented here is that it is crucial to distinguish 
between the multiple forms of Islam practised in the UK today and the 
specific nature of Salafi-jihadist fundamentalism. Once we can grasp this, 
it becomes possible to understand the opposition to Salafi-jihadism from 
within Islam. The Iranian Quranic scholar and writer Navid Kermani has 
spoken out against Saudi sponsorship of Salafism as a travesty of the 
‘multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural Orient’:  
Sponsored with billions from the oil industry [this is] a school of thought 
that has been promoted for decades in mosques, in books and on 
television that declares all people from all other religions heretics, and 
reviles, terrorises, disparages and insults them…That such a religious 
fascism even became conceivable, that IS finds so many fighters and 
even more sympathisers… - that is not the beginning, but rather the 
end point of a long decline…of religious thought (2015: 80-81). 
The work of Karima Bennoune has powerfully documented resistance to 
fundamentalist violence from Muslims across the world in her book ‘Your 
Fatwa Does Not Apply Here’ (2013). As she notes, ‘Many people of Muslim 
heritage are staunch opponents of fundamentalism and terrorism, for 
good reason… they are much more likely to be the targets. Only 15% of Al 
Qaeda’s victims in 2004-08 were westerners’ (Bennoune, 2014). In the UK, 
Sara Khan, who now leads the new government Commission for 
Countering Extremism, has described the work of anti-fundamentalist 
campaign ‘Making A Stand’ which, with funding from Prevent, has: 
visited hundreds of Muslim women in 9 cities across the UK and which 
taught mothers theological counter-narratives to extremist ideology 
and how they can safeguard their children against radicalisation…We 
delivered this campaign because of the high demand; these same 
women did not feel that ‘representative’ Muslim organisations or 
mosques were providing them with such support (Khan, 2016) 
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Understanding the significance of these arguments does not mean 
approaching Prevent uncritically, but it could shift the way we understand 
Social Work’s involvement in Prevent. 
  
We begin our discussion with one of the most widely cited critics of 
Prevent, Arun Kundnani, who situates this as a policy seeking to enforce a 
pro-Western ideological conformity among British Muslims. We then 
move to a discussion of Prevent and its 2015 revision, which drew the 
profession of Social Work into this area of work. We characterise the 
debate within Social Work in terms of two paradigms – ‘Safeguarding’ 
versus ‘Surveillance’. We look firstly at the ‘Safeguarding’ approach, which 
situates concern around the contested concept of ‘radicalisation’ through 
a focus on the vulnerability of young people recruited into fundamentalist 
violence and the harms done to them as a consequence.  We then consider 
two important critiques of this within the Social Work literature, firstly, 
from Jo Finch and David McKendrick (2017) and secondly, from Surinder 
Guru and Tony Stanley (2015). This work argues that, rather than a 
legitimate extension of Social Work’s focus on ‘risk’, Prevent represents 
the recruitment of Social Work into a strategy of state surveillance. We 
conclude by critically evaluating this debate and setting out a third position 
which argues for a critical defence of a safeguarding approach based on 
the harms which fundamentalist violence represents to children and 
young people. However, we reject the idea that this is a question of ‘British 
values’. Rather, we argue that the position is based on the understanding 
that Salafi-jihadism is a political movement of the extreme right, akin to 
white supremacist neo-fascist groupings which are increasingly also the 
object of Prevent. We conceptualise the growth of both of these sorts of 
violent fascistic politics within the context of the ongoing crisis of 
neoliberal capitalism and welfare retrenchment; not reducible to it, but 
part of the conditions which frame the ‘vulnerability’ of people drawn into 
these forms of political agency. We conclude by outlining some alternative 
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policy directions which concern the need to develop a wider and more 
politically formed analysis of fundamentalist violence, and the need to 
combat this through a positive, political project of a democratisation and 
social rights, including particularly the rights of women, as the basis of this. 
 
Counter-terrorism: a new Cold War? 
How was the young Roshonara Choudhry drawn into the world of Salafi-
jihadism? Questions like this have emerged as a central theme in the 
attempt by state agencies wanting to do more than simply respond to 
violent attacks on public space, but are also trying to prevent people being 
recruited into the networks which are supportive of this violence.  This has 
led to the creation of ‘Radicalisation Studies’, a new body of knowledge 
created through the work of think tanks, university research departments, 
and counter-terrorist agencies. Arun Kundnani notes that: 
In the context of the evolving ‘war on terror’, this new discussion of 
radicalisation could present itself as the wider, more liberal alternative 
to the simple accounts of terrorism offered immediately after 9/11. It 
acknowledged that terrorism was a problem which could be 
investigated, analysed and subjected to policy solutions beyond the use 
of physical force. In actuality, however, the radicalisation discourse 
was, from the beginning, circumscribed by the demands of the counter-
terrorist policy-makers rather than an attempt to study objectively how 
terrorism comes into being… constraining the intellectual process to 
the needs of government security establishments (2012: 5)  
In his 2012 article ‘Radicalisation: the journey of a concept’, subsequently 
incorporated in his 2014 book The Muslims Are Coming, Kundnani sets out 
the failures of the way Radicalisation Studies has conceptualised the 
reasons for why individuals are drawn to violent forms of Islamic 
fundamentalism. His central argument is that their work represents a 
profound misdiagnosis of the problem, as the answers they have come up 
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with ‘exclude ascribing any causative role to the actions of western 
governments or their allies in other parts of the world’ (Kundnani, 2012: 
5). Hence, the modelling of ‘the process by which an individual was 
thought to become a supporter of the extremist ideologies thought to lie 
behind terrorist violence’ (Kundnani, 2012: 6) is constructed by removing 
from consideration what he argues to be the central motivational factor. 
As a result, what emerges are anti-radicalisation strategies in which:  
Muslims are to be won over to a pro-western ‘narrative’ using the same 
ideological approach that has been favoured in the early cold war.  An 
ideological battle against radical Islamism thus becomes the new anti-
communism, with ‘moderate Muslims’ the new non-communist Left 
whom the CIA had sought to recruit against Moscow in the 1950s 
(Kundnani, 2012: 16) 
Prevent, according to Kundnani, is thus part of a new Cold War in which 
the spectre of Communism has been replaced by a spectre of Radical Islam. 
And because initiatives such as Prevent are founded on this flawed 
understanding of the problem, they have come to treat entire Muslim 
communities as ‘suspect communities’, resulting in policies which have 
caused ‘discrimination and unwarranted restrictions in civil liberties’ 
(Kundnani, 2012: 8). In a more recent interview in which he develops his 
analysis of the politics and ideology of Salafi-jihadist groups, Kundnani 
argues: 
What draws recruits to ISIS is not so much religious ideology as an 
image of war between the west and Islam. This is a narrative of two 
fixed identities engaged in a global battle: truth and justice on one side; 
lies, depravity and corruption on the other. These recruits are not 
corrupted by ideology but by the end of ideology: they have grown up 
in the era of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’, of no alternatives to 
capitalist globalisation. They have known no critique, only conspiracy 
theory, and are drawn to apocalyptic rather than popular struggle. 
Nevertheless, for all its lack of actual political content, the narrative of 
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global war against the west feels to its adherents like an answer to the 
violence of racism, poverty and empire (2015). 
 
Fundamentalist Violence 
Kundnani’s work has been significant because he was both an early critic 
of the programme but also one who has had a real influence outside 
academia, particularly within anti-racist activism, where his 
characterisation of Prevent as a form of anti-Muslim state racism is 
influential. While there is certainly truth in Kundnani’s claim that much of 
the research into radicalisation is funded by agencies which are close to 
the US and Israeli governments, we would argue that Kundnani is too 
cavalier in his dismissal of this material.iv There is within this body of work 
material which is itself critical of the reductionist accounts of radicalisation 
which Kundnani is criticising (see for example Silke, 2008; Schmid, 2013; 
Rausch, 2015; and Rahimi & Graumans, 2015)v. However, our fundamental 
disagreement with Kundnani is his claim that radicalisation is essentially 
and primarily driven by opposition to the actions of Western governments. 
Across the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, thousands of people 
are involved in Salafi-jihadist groups – is all of this simply a reaction to 
Western governments? Is there not a problem with an ‘anti-imperialist’ 
analysis which argues, as Chetan Bhatt notes, that ‘there is no authentic 
non-Western political agency unless it is as a reaction to the West’s cultural 
or military aggression?’ (2017: 12). While Kundnani is clearly critical of the 
‘conspiracy theories’ upon which he sees Salafi-jihadist movements as 
based, he implicitly endorses the ‘anti-imperialist’ nature of their politics, 
as though they are right but for the wrong reasons. However, as Bhatt has 
argued, such a view is only possible if one completely disregards ‘the 
massive opposition to salafi-jihadis in the Middle East, north Africa and 
south Asia’ formed as a consequence of the extreme violence toward 
civilian populations in those countries (2014: 26). Similarly, if we consider 
the case of Roshonara Choudhry, it was clear that al-Awlaki’s arguments 
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against the Iraq war were important, but how does this explain her desire 
to die as ‘a martyr’? If her concern was simply with the Iraq War, Choudhry 
could have visited Timms at his office and argued with him, or 
demonstrated against the war outside his surgeryvi. In fact, her motivation 
as she described it to the police was entirely consistent with Salafi-jihadist 
thinking, in which ‘visceral violence’ and death by martyrdom are 
expressions of virtue (Bhatt, 2014: 26). The Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq Abu Al-
Zaqawi emphasised this centrality of ideology in their project when he 
stated that: 
‘They [the American Armed Forces] think that we fight for money and 
prestige – what they do not understand is that our arteries are filled 
with the ideology of jihad.’ (Maher, 2017: 21)   
In other words, by characterising radicalisation primarily as a reaction to 
social and economic factors, Kundnani entirely fails to grasp the way Salafi-
jihadism is ‘not only a system of ideas but an aesthetic and cultural 
universe of meaning’ (Bhatt, 2014: 27).  Adherents like Roshonara 
Choudhry earnestly and consciously adopted this, and it is significant in her 
case, as with others, that this had no basis in concerns around ‘racism, 
poverty and Empire’. 
 
While these movements gain support and recruits by interpolating 
economic, political, and social crises, they do so through a specifically 
religious language of salvation and virtue, in which acts of violence are 
justified in very specifically theological terms. The quote from Anwar al-
Awlaki at the beginning of this piece is noteworthy for the way it 
characterises the Iraq invasion, not through the Left’s language of ‘anti-
imperialism’ but as an ‘insult to Islam’. The issue for Salafi-jihadist thinkers 
is actually not the racism or imperialism of the West – these are, rather, 
seen as symptoms of a much deeper problem concerned with the ‘godless 
nature of modernity’ that animates religious fundamentalist thinking 
Feminist Dissent 
 
103 Cowden and Picken, Feminist Dissent (4), pp. 91-131 
across all faith traditions (Armstrong, 2000; Cowden & Sahgal, 2017). 
Maher has noted that Salafi-jihadists justify their violence not as 
opposition to an invading colonial power, but rather because the ‘entire 
notion of the modern nation-state is a heterodox insult to Islam where 
temporal legislation usurps God’s sovereignty’ (2017: 11). As the 2003 Al-
Qaeda’s Manifesto cited earlier noted, the fact that these rulers are ‘infidel 
apostates’ makes ‘armed and violent rebellion’ not just desirable, but ‘an 
individual duty on every Muslim’ (in Maher, 2017: 11). Running throughout 
this entire body of theological argument is an obsessively Manichean 
discourse about who is and is not a ‘true’ Muslim, and it is through this that 
they violently impose their version of Islam as the only pure and authentic 
one. Like all forms of religious fundamentalism which justify themselves in 
terms of being a ‘return to the past’, they are very much products of the 
present. While the notion of the global Islamic ‘ummah’ has been around 
for much of the 20th century, it has received a massive boost through 
recent technological developments like the internet.vii Salafi-jihadist 
ideological development has also taken place very recently – as 
Hegghammer notes, this form of thinking only began to be distinguished 
from other forms of political Islamism in the early 1990s (2009: 246). These 
movements are anything but ‘medieval’, as they are often mistakenly 
characterised by liberal critics (Armstrong, 2000; Cowden & Sahgal, 2017). 
It is important to understand that, while Salafi-jihadist groups arise out of 
Islam, the version of Islam they offer is distinct from and deliberately 
destructive to both mainstream and heterodox historic forms of Muslim 
religious practice and belief. Nothing demonstrates the almost absurdly 
violent sectarianism of their project so clearly as Anwar al-Awlaki’s 
statement that ‘If a Muslim kills each and every civilian disbeliever on the 
face of the earth he is still a Muslim and we cannot side with the 
disbelievers against him’ (Bennoune, 2010). It is in the name of such a 
project that these groups seek to ‘purify’ Islam, which they achieve through 
disciplining, repudiating, expelling, and murdering those who believe in a 
more tolerant, pluralist, and hybrid conception of Islam.   
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Directly related to the way Arun Kundnani, and much progressive opinion with 
him, have conceptualised radicalisation through the lens of their own critique 
of the racism and imperialism of Western governments, is the failure to name 
the politics of Salafi-jihadism as a politics of the extreme right. Bhatt has noted 
that while ‘the Western far- and neo-Nazi right may view Salafi-Jihadis and 
political Islamists as mortal enemies, they are all political tendencies of the far 
right, whatever their atavistic claims about each other’ (2017: 3). The Algerian 
sociologist Marième Helie-Lucas has argued similarly that these groups are 
‘political movements of the extreme right, which, in a context of globalization, 
e.g. forceful international economic exploitation and free-for-all capitalism, 
manipulate religion, culture, or ethnicity, in order to achieve their political 
aims’ (Helie-Lucas, 2004). Helie-Lucas notes the way these groups often gain 
influence is by taking over the process of offering social support to working 
class and poor communities, precisely in the context of neoliberal state 
withdrawal from social provision. She has described the rise of Islamist politics 
in the neglected and impoverished suburbs of French cities, noting that: 
the big strength of the fundamentalist far-right is that they understood 
very early that the state abandonment of its duties towards specific 
categories of citizens, and the decline of the old Communist Parties’ 
social activities in working-class areas of big cities, created a space for 
them, whether in [North Africa] or in Europe. ‘Political Islam’ is a 
popular, and populist, movement. This…has been the fertile ground on 
which young men, and now young women too, become ‘radicalised’, 
thanks to the social work done by the Muslim far-right: the youth 
camps and sports clubs; the after-school tutoring; the sermons; the 
free distribution of clothing (including, of course, distributing so-called 
‘Islamic dress’ in the process); and books (including, of course, 
fundamentalist literature); the material help brought to homes where 
the bread winner just died; etc. (Helie-Lucas, 2015) 
This points to another central issue, which is the way Salafi-jihadist 
thinkers are – in common with forms of fundamentalism in all religions – 
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intensely concerned with controlling women’s bodies and sexuality within 
a divinely sanctioned patriarchal family order. Patricia Madigan’s work on 
both Christian and Islamic fundamentalism argues that while these are 
generally understood as ‘reactive movements against the forces of 
modernity’, few have recognised their ‘essentially patriarchal character’ 
and that the process of ‘selectively retrieving doctrines, beliefs and 
practices’ from the past is driven by the desire ‘to shape a religious identity 
that will then become the basis of a recreated neo-patriarchal order’ 
(Madigan, 2011: 2). When Al Awlaki states that ‘We are very conservative 
when it comes to family values. We are against the moral decay that we 
see in the society’ (New York Times, 2010), it is crucial to note within this 
framework that it is the sexualised female body that essentially 
demonstrates the moral decay and godlessness of the West.viii   Nadje Al-
Ali has argued that Salafi-jihadist doctrine cannot be understood without 
understanding how central the control of women through violence is, and 
the way this plays out at many different levels – the home, the public 
space, and the battlefield where ‘the control of women’s bodies, their 
mobility, their sexuality, is a key strategy to demarcate boundaries 
between us versus them’ (Leimbach, 2017). The mass rapes which ISIS 
carried out towards Yazidi women in 2016 is an example of the way brutal 
misogyny converges with the Manichean us/them ideology that runs 
through the Salafi-jihadist project; hence, the horrific levels of violence 
enacted on non-Salafi women becomes an expression of Salafi-jihadist 
conceptions of salvation and virtue, but also of state-buildingix. This points 
to the real problem with the kind of analysis which Kundnani’s work 
typifies – where the cause of radicalisation is framed as a response to the 
racism and imperialism of Western governments – which is that it has 
virtually nothing to say about this defining dimension of the Salafi-jihadist 
project. 
 
Social Work and Prevent  
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The UK government’s counter-terrorist policy Contest was developed 
initially in 2003 with significant revisions in 2006, 2011, and 2015 (Home 
Office 2015a, Home Office 2015b). This strategy is all part of the process 
by which British counter-terrorist policy was shifted from Northern 
Ireland-related terrorism, and in the wake of the 9/11 and then the 7/7 
bombings, to focus on the forms of terrorism concerned with ‘radicalised 
individuals seen to be using a distorted and unrepresentative version of 
the Islamic faith to justify violence’ (Home Office, 2006: 1). The strategy 
was organised around four ‘principal strands’ of activity:  
PURSUE: to stop terrorist attacks 
PREVENT: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent 
extremism 
PROTECT: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack 
PREPARE: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its’ impact 
 
Prevent was developed as a strand of Contest but has developed as a 
policy in its own right, concerned with establishing arrangements which 
seeks to help people ‘at risk of becoming involved in terrorism’, as well as 
disrupting the activities of those involved in ‘radicalising others’. The 
Prevent Review and Revised Strategy 2011 (Home Office, 2011b) 
undertaken by the Cross-Bench Peer Lord Carlile introduced greater levels 
of multi-agency collaboration and reasserted the earlier aim of seeking to 
‘stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (Home Office, 
2011b: 6).  Most significantly, this Review elaborated the concept of 
‘Fundamental British values’, with ‘extremism’ defined within policy as: 
Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include within our 
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definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed 
forces. (Home Office, 2011b: 7). 
This characterisation of ‘fundamental British values’ has been a major 
focus for criticism of Prevent from progressives, but this characterisation 
of fundamentalist violence as primarily ‘un-British’ offers a deeply 
reductionist understanding of Salafi-jihadist ideology, indeed, one that 
mirrors the reductionism that animates the views of those who are most 
critical of Prevent.  
 
The ‘multi-agency’ focus of the 2011 shifts in policy also laid the basis of 
further criticisms concerning the implementation of Prevent which, having 
begun as a counter-terrorist strategy, began to morph into areas such as 
community development and youth work, but with the police still in a 
leading role. This led to widespread criticism of Prevent that it was 
‘blurring professional roles and boundaries’ (Thomas, 2010: 449) and that 
‘the implication of teachers and youth, community and cultural workers in 
information-sharing undercuts professional norms of confidentiality’ 
(Kundnani 2014: 28). The most recent policy revision is Prevent Duty 
Guidance of 2015 (Home Office, 2015c) and the significance of this lies in 
the way it has re-focussed the entire problem of ‘radicalisation’, 
addressing at least some of these problems. Moving still further away from 
the securitised focus of earlier policy, radicalisation has now become a 
‘safeguarding’ issue, with Local Authorities given a statutory duty to have 
‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism’ (Home Office, 2015c). The Department for Education now 
requires Local Safeguarding Children Boards to consider radicalisation 
within the context of the 2015 Statutory Guidance Working Together to 
Safeguard Children (DfE, 2015), and it is in this way that Social Work has 
been directly drawn into the orbit of the Prevent and Channel policy 
(Home Office, 2015d). In relation to the points made above, Prevent and 
Channel panels do not involve counter-terrorism police being embedded 
Feminist Dissent 
 
108 Cowden and Picken, Feminist Dissent (4), pp. 91-131 
with social workers, rather, social workers work alongside the police and 
partner agencies, as they do in safeguarding work already.  
  
These changes represent a significant re-focussing both of safeguarding 
and of counter-terrorism, and therefore the question of how this has been 
viewed within Social Work is an important part of this discussion.  At a 
packed Community Care Live event on November 2015, social workers 
heard Alamgir Sheriyar, active referral coordinator for Kent Police, argue 
that: 
When we talk about radicalisation, child sexual exploitation, and issues 
with gangs, it is exactly the same process…What we’re talking about is 
vulnerable young people…who are being targeted not because they are 
bad people or want to get involved in criminal activity, [but] because 
they are vulnerable and they need a sense of belonging, and through 
that grooming process they are given that. 
At that same event, Social Work academic Jo Finch challenged this point, 
asking whether Social Work was ‘getting into dangerous ideological 
grounds…Is this our role? Should it be our role? (Community Care, 2015) – 
points which are elaborated further in her critique of Prevent below. A 
more recent discussion forum run by The Guardian in March 2016 offered 
unanimous support for the principle of seeing radicalisation as a 
safeguarding issue analogous to child sexual exploitation (CSE), as these 
responses demonstrate: 
Paul Rigby, lecturer in social work, University of Stirling: ‘I would 
consider all these to be inter-related in so much as they are all likely to 
constitute child protection concerns, with children presenting with an 
array of risk and needs. The complexities of exploitation often indicate 
crossovers between what we may initially consider to be separate 
issues.’ (Hardy, 2016) 
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Carly Adams, specialist in child sexual exploitation and youth at risk at 
the Children’s Society: ‘There are definitely lots of common themes 
between them – in terms of the level of power and control used, the 
impact of trauma, the need for a child protection response.’ (Hardy, 
2016) 
Nazir Afzal, the former Chief Prosecutor who secured convictions in the 
Rochdale grooming trial, has also argued for the recognition of the striking 
similarities in the way young people are groomed for sex and for acts of 
terrorism: 
In the first stage, the child is manipulated…A young person feels 
unwanted, unloved, misunderstood and somebody comes along, either 
some charismatic person or online, and says ‘I want you’, ‘I understand 
you.’ The person thinks somebody is finally listening to them. 
Generally, these people know what buttons to press. Having 
manipulated them, the next stage is distancing, where the young 
person is told not to trust anybody else – don’t trust your family, don’t 
trust your friends. The third stage is sexual grooming or with 
radicalisation, it’s taking them away. The process is the same. 
(Scotsman, 2016) 
In 2017, the Department for Education carried out an evaluation of this 
work, published as the report Safeguarding and Radicalisation. This report 
offers important evidence as to how people involved in undertaking this 
work are perceiving and experiencing this. The report evaluates ten Local 
Authorities across the UK, in areas defined as ‘high,’ ‘middle’, and ‘low 
prevalence’ areas (defined through the number of referrals they receive). 
While there is mixed evidence about how this is working, one of the most 
significant findings is that those doing this work perceive that it is working 
most effectively in areas of high prevalence. These are most likely to be 
urban inner-city areas with significant Muslim populations. Social workers 
working in this area clearly support the contention that radicalisation falls 
within the remit of safeguarding. This report noted that there was in some 
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of the Local Authorities ‘no internal consensus within an authority on how 
the threat of radicalisation should be responded to’ (2017: 5) and this 
resulted in confusion for staff and families referred to the Prevent and 
Channel programmes. This was much more of a problem in ‘low 
prevalence’ areas. By contrast, ‘where staff are confident in how they 
should handle radicalisation cases, they were also better able to engage 
effectively with families and children who are at risk’ (2017: 6). This is 
significant for the way it shows that Social Workers doing this work clearly 
feel they are – when they have the support of their managers and agencies 
– effectively safeguarding young people from harm in this work. 
 
While there was initially considerable suspicion about Prevent amongst 
individuals and families referred to the programme in areas with high 
Muslim populations, the report evidences that this was usually able to be 
overcome with explanations which addressed people’s fears about the 
intention of the programme. The report cites one incident of a father 
whose son was referred to the programme being initially overtly hostile to 
the programme, but as he came to see how it worked, completely reversed 
his view and went on to volunteer locally for it (2017: 25-26).  Another 
significant conclusion is that those most overtly hostile to it are precisely 
those about whom one would have an entirely justified concern about 
their involvement with Salafi-jihadist networks. 
 
Concern was expressed by social workers about the treatment of those 
families whose children were not found to have legitimate concerns, with 
it being felt that these people were being left without appropriate support 
or adequate explanation. A related concern for practitioners were 
‘overzealous’ referrals (2017: 6) often from Schools and Health 
Authorities. 
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The conclusions from the Report focussed on measures concerned with 
clarifying responsibilities, streamlining referrals, and building and sharing 
an evidence base to learn from previous practice, as well as ‘engaging with 
communities to build awareness and understanding’ (2017: 6-7). While the 
2017 DfE Report evidences genuine concerns around implementation, this 
work is part of an emerging evidence base concerning the appropriateness 
of social work’s involvement in work around radicalisation as part of the 
safeguarding process.   
 
One of the most important implications for Social Work that comes from 
this evaluation is that where social workers feel well supported by their 
agencies, they can work effectively with presenting concerns in a 
safeguarding role. By the same token, this becomes very difficult when 
practitioners are working in agencies which had not developed an 
understanding of these issues. What we would see as crucial is that the 
safeguarding role is combined with a contextualised political 
understanding of Salafi-jihadism as a political movement and an ideology.  
This is even more acutely important when working with families with 
important connections to the Middle East and North Africa, where these 
groups are most active.   
 
We would argue that it was just this political understanding that was 
lacking in the Serious Case Review (SCR) undertaken into the deaths of ‘W’ 
and ‘X’, two teenage brothers from the Brighton and Hove area who 
travelled to Syria in 2014 where they joined the Al-Nusra Front, an al-
Qaeda affiliate (Brighton & Hove LSCB, 2017). Tragically, both siblings were 
killed while in Syria. The SCR was set up to investigate the fact that, despite 
extensive involvement with Children’s Services over several years, 
practitioners failed to anticipate the possibility of the children being 
recruited into Salafi-jihadist networks. The background to this case is 
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complex. The family, which comprised the parents and five siblings, had 
fled to the UK from Libya in the late 1980s to early 1990s where they had 
previously been part of that country’s educated social elite. The family left 
Libya as a consequence of persecution by the Libyan regime which 
developed from the regime’s perception that some members of the 
families were Islamists (2017: 13). In a related development, an uncle of 
the family had been imprisoned in Guantánamo Bay, though he was 
subsequently released without charge. However, once the latter 
information became public knowledge, the family were directly targeted 
by neo-Nazis in Brighton, which included demonstrations outside their 
house and graffiti in the area in which they lived, stating ‘Behead All 
Muslims’ (2017: 12). The contact between Children’s Services and the 
family came about through evidence of the children's early trauma 
associated with their exposure to domestic violence against their mother 
from their father, and services appeared to have struggled to provide an 
appropriate response to this. In 2010, ‘W’ and a younger brother ‘Q’ 
disclosed at a youth club that they had experienced physical abuse from 
their father in relation to their lack of observance of their religion. All five 
brothers were placed on child protection plans and their mother moved to 
alternative accommodation, but the Crown Prosecution Service took no 
further action against the father following retraction of the statements by 
the siblings. 
 
A key issue that comes up throughout the SCR was the way services failed 
to engage with the political significance of Salafi-jihadism within the 
family, particularly given the information that was before them, and this 
contributed directly to the two young brothers’ later disappearance to 
Syria. For example, services were aware that an older brother of ‘W’ and 
‘X’ had travelled to Syria, but had accepted entirely at face value the claim 
that this role was purely related to ‘supporting aid work’. Finding 6 of the 
SCR notes the need to:  
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provide children and young people with information and evidence to 
counter the propaganda that they may be accessing on the internet and 
the impact of peer pressure via social networking: to be effective this 
will need to address the appeal of belonging to particular groups, who 
provide a strong identity, promise the resolution of the world's 
problems and social injustices (2017: 45) 
While this is undoubtedly correct, the problem seems to us lie more in the 
way services working with the family struggled to conceptualise the issues 
that were presenting in the family in a holistic way. This involves grasping 
the way the family were both victims of racist persecution as well being 
part of violent Salafi-jihadist networks, not to mention all the other family 
issues that services were dealing with. The key to this in our view is having 
a political understanding of what Salafi-jihadism represents, both in 
understanding the extent to which it diverges from mainstream forms of 
Islam, as well as considering the possibility of connections between this 
ideology and the violence toward female family members and toward the 
children for ‘lack of religious observance’. This political understanding can 
be crucial in allowing practitioners to make the connections between 
Salafi-jihadism as a world-view and the statements and actions of family 
members. For example, when sibling ‘X’ was arrested in 2012 for anti-
social behaviour, he shouted at the police that ‘they would die as they did 
not follow Allah, that they would burn in hell on judgement day and that 
the day was coming very soon’ (2017: 50) – a statement which clearly 
reflects Salafi-jihadist themes, but which fail to occasion any specific 
recognition as such. Another sibling, ‘Q’, returned from a trip to Libya 
making strong outbursts against ‘Americans’ (2017: 51) which were 
perceived as understandable in the context of the fighting which was 
taking place in Libya at this time, but were not explored any further by 
practitioners. It is always important for practitioners to understand and be 
curious about the communities in the areas they work, including issues of 
culture, identity, and religion. But rather than reaching too readily for the 
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culturally relativist argument, we would argue that practitioners need to 
be aware of what the people we are working with are telling us about how 
they see the world, and to be aware of the implications this may have. 
Ideologies and identities are never innocent – they are always situated in 
a social and political context, and as practitioners, we need to know about 
this. In relation to our earlier arguments about the (often violent) control 
exerted towards women within Salafi-jihadism, we would add that this is 
another crucial indicator where practitioners could have put different 
pieces of the situation facing this family together. In terms of future 
learning, we would argue it also raises the importance of agencies 
developing resources and strategies to engage women who are at risk, but 
who might resist becoming involved with services for fear of wider 
family/community rejection. 
 
 Prevent as Surveillance 
We now want to turn to those arguments mounted by a range of Social 
Work academics who have expressed concerns that Prevent represents a 
form of ideological policing, stifling children and young people’s entirely 
legitimate interest in political causes and in being critical of the 
government. It should be noted at the outset that there is nothing new 
about the argument that social workers are involved in ‘policing’ families, 
the working class, minority communities, and/or women, and these 
arguments have been made of Social Work for several decades (see for 
example Donzelot, 1997; Jones, 1983; and Smart, 1992). The analysis 
offered by Finch and McKendrick in their 2017 British Journal of Social 
Work piece “Under Heavy Manners” could be seen as drawing on this 
work. With regard to Prevent, their key argument is that, in a context 
where state policy is seeking to institutionalise new forms of social 
inequality, the social work role is becoming ‘securitised’ (2017: 315). 
Prevent, they argue, targets families who are economically deprived and 
‘discriminated against due to racism and Islamaphobia’ (2017: 313): 
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The suggestion that social workers should infiltrate families in this way 
is a deliberate ideological attempt to remake social work and to 
diminish trust-based relationships. In this new incarnation, social work 
is fundamentally judgemental and exists as an agent of social control in 
terms of targeting service users with values, cultural practices or 
ideological beliefs that do not accord with Western neo-liberal ones 
(2017: 318). 
The claim that Muslim families experience Prevent as ‘infiltration’ is 
offered without specific evidence, and this is a feature of many critics of 
the policy. We would argue that, while there is undoubtedly mistrust 
between Muslim communities and state agencies like social work in the 
present context, it is important of the extent to which there are divergent 
views towards Prevent within Muslim communities. Alongside those 
sceptical of the intent of this policy are those who have serious concern 
that it is their children who are most heavily targeted by Salafi-jihadists, 
and who are seeking support from state agencies like social workers to 
deal with this. The DfE report cited above (2017) also demonstrates that 
social workers involved in safeguarding work in this context have been 
able to build trust-based relationships with Muslim families, and this 
points to the way practitioners and families are able to work around the 
specific threat to children and young people posed by Salafi-jihadist 
radicalisation. It is for this reason that we would question Finch and 
McKendrick’s claim that Prevent is essentially concerned with the policing 
of cultural practices not in accordance with ‘Western neo-liberal beliefs’, 
but we would also point out that the authors’ objection to these beliefs is 
of an entirely different order to the objections of Salafi-jihadists. In other 
words, like many critics of Prevent, Finch and McKendrick fail to critically 
interrogate what Salafi-jihadists and their sympathisers actually stand for. 
Indeed, groups such as CAGE, which have showed consistent support for 
Salafi-jihadist ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki (Bhatt 2017: 13), have 
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popularised just these sorts of arguments by presenting measures which 
are taken against violent fundamentalists as attacks on ‘all Muslims’x.   
  
Tony Stanley and Surinder Guru offer a still stronger critique of 
involvement with Prevent, arguing that through this, ‘social workers might 
find themselves pawns in an ideologically driven moral panic’ (2015: 354). 
The central issue they challenge with the shift toward safeguarding is that 
it denies ‘the political nature of terrorism’, offering instead ‘pathologising 
discourses’ which position social workers as ‘akin to ‘thought police’ (2015: 
357): 
By emphasising the ‘vulnerability’ of individuals, these processes of risk 
assessment and prevention give primacy to a ‘deficit thinking’ risk 
model that the population in question is deficient and in need of 
improvement/treatment. This emphasis on normative systems and 
networks gives primacy to positivist, psychologising discourses which 
deny individuals agency and the political nature of their experiences 
and social problems. The focus on individuals and families isolates them 
from being seen in their holistic socio-economic, political context and 
their resistance to oppression and injustice is seen as an aberration, a 
problem, a state of mind which can be changed, treated and 
normalised by the introduction of alternative activities, relationships 
and networks. For this reason, amongst many Muslim communities, 
Prevent and Channel are primarily seen as tools for surveillance of 
Muslim children, justified by particular ideological constructions about 
the processes causing radicalisation (2015: 358-9). 
As with both Kundnani and Finch and McKendrick, Stanley and Guru 
present a picture of widespread opposition to Prevent from ‘many Muslim 
communities’ which we would argue falsely homogenises the range of 
views around Prevent amongst Muslims. More problematic still is their 
claim that the adoption of Salafi-jihadist views represents ‘resistance to 
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oppression’. While they are right to point to the way an entirely 
pathological discourse about radicalisation denies the extent to which it is 
‘political’ – and one of the key arguments we have made here is that it is 
most definitely political – Stanley and Guru ignore the fact that even an 
elementary consideration of the content of this shows it to be politics 
replete with the most hateful sectarianism, anti-Semitism, misogyny, and 
homophobia. One wonders if Stanley and Guru would argue that young 
men who join white nationalist groups like the English Defence League are 
equally demonstrating ‘resistance to oppression’ in attributing their 
poverty and joblessness to Muslims and immigrants?  This article 
concludes with the statement that: 
The call to arms across the Muslim countries resonates with Muslims 
across the globe, a process facilitated by the concept of ‘Ummah’ or 
unity amongst Muslims which has intensified after 9/11.  This can be 
seen as a product of political awareness, borne out of the exploitation 
and oppression by the West and the alienation it has generated (2015: 
361).    
There is something deeply problematic about the way this statement lends 
legitimacy to the language and approach of Salafi-jihadist groups – what 
we are talking about here are groups whose politics were manifested 
through the Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris, the mass rapes of Yazidi 
women carried out by ISIS, and the indoctrination of 10-year- olds into 
acting as suicide bombers in Syria and Afghanistan (Bloom 2017, Bloom 
and Horgan, 2015). Stanley and Guru’s characterisation of Salafi-jihadist 
groups as analogous to anti-imperial freedom fighters sits utterly 
incongruously with the evidence of how these groups have horrifically 
violated the human rights of women, children, and civilian populations in 
general with barbaric cruelty. The way these authors can overlook the 
latter and, at the same time, call for a ‘rights based approach’ in Social 
Work practice (2015: 362) really bespeaks the extent of confusion amongst 
progressive opinion with regard to what Salafi-jihadists actually represent. 
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While it is crucial for Social Workers to understand the pathways that can 
lead to such fundamentalist violence – and one would say the exact same 
thing about white neo-fascists – what is completely missing from this 
account is any sense of the need to challenge these, both at the level of 
Social Work values, as well as the need to safeguard children and young 
people from associated harm. Reading this material, one is left asking how 
it is that critical and intelligent Social Work academics and practitioners 
such as they are prepared to grant credibility to political ideologies that 
are utterly opposed to the values of human rights and equality to which 
they are clearly committed. 
 
Conclusion – Some Future Policy Directions 
Throughout this piece, we have argued that it is crucial that those who 
take questions of human rights seriously engage with the substantive 
agenda of Salafi-jihadists. This involves understanding the way this 
represents a significant development within non-violent conservative and 
puritanical versions of Islam into the violently Manichean political 
movements we now see wreaking havoc across the world. In such a 
context, it is crucial for left and progressive thinking to move beyond 
confusing their own opposition to the ‘war on terror’ based on the 
violation of human rights with the reactionary and brutal violence of the 
Salafi-jihadists. The need to better understand this political agenda is 
crucial both for Social Work education and practice. One of the issues 
which stands out for us from the Brighton and Hove SCR is that, in order 
to protect children and young people from the harms which stem from 
radicalisation, practitioners need to have a much better informed sense of 
the attitudes and character which those who are grooming these young 
people are seeking to nurture. Being curious about this can make a crucial 
difference to the safeguarding role, and we need to be completely clear 
that this is not the same as acting as ‘thought police’. Social work’s concern 
is not in any way preventing critical thinking – indeed, it is more important 
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than ever that we encourage this. But we are concerned with preventing 
young people being drawn into Salafi-jihadist networks where they may 
be killed or raped, be required to carry out murders and rapes, and if they 
are caught, spend their lives in prison as Roshonara Choudhry is currently 
doing. It is in the light of this understanding that we would mount a critical 
defence of the safeguarding focus within Prevent and Channel, and we 
would additionally argue that this is entirely congruent with the Social 
Work focus on harm from the abuse and exploitation these clearly 
represent to children and young people. We would argue, however, that 
taking this position does not mean that there are not problems with the 
Prevent policy as it is currently constituted. As far back as 2009, Yahya Birt 
noted that the central problem with the policy has been its ‘overemphasis 
upon counter-terrorism without engaging Muslims as citizens rather than 
an “at risk” set communities’ (Birt, 2009: 54). This is crucial not just from a 
civil liberties perspective, but also because it acknowledges the extent of 
opposition to Salafi-jihadism amongst Muslims. It is in this sense that we 
would argue for the removal of Lord Carlile’s definition of extremism as 
opposition to ‘fundamental British values’. While democracy, the rule of 
law, and tolerance are undoubtedly important, it is not clear how these 
are specifically ‘British’; they could be considered as universal democratic 
norms. Equally problematically, the focus on ‘British values’ constructs 
Salafi-jihadist violence as a problem of Muslims who are insufficiently 
integrated or loyal to the British nation. As we have argued, Salafi-jihadism 
is a transnational politics akin to white supremacist neo-fascism, and it is 
both myopic as well as simply incorrect to characterise its violence as ‘un-
British’, not least because the vast majority of its victims are Muslim, and 
additionally because so much of its violence is specifically directed against 
women. We also argue that neo-liberal austerity and welfare 
retrenchment policies as they have been implemented for the last decade 
continue to create the conditions for radicalisation, both in producing 
those forms of individual despair and isolation which make Manichean 
solutions attractive, as well as reducing the capacity for social workers, 
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youth workers, and third sector agencies to provide more hopeful and 
creative alternatives for our young people. The Prevent policy we would 
like to see developed is one which would base itself on explicit political 
arguments for a reconstructed democratic and rights- based social 
welfarist politics. While the extent to which Salafi-jihadism represents a 
very specific violation of women’s rights has been something we have only 
touched on in this article, we also believe that the future development of 
preventative strategies must involve support for those women and men 
who are working toward gender-based equality, which must itself be seen 
as a central component of a more just and equal future for society as a 
whole.  
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i We would like to thank all the individuals who made comments on drafts of this piece, in 
particular Gurnam Singh, John Pitts, James Alexander, Liz Kelly, Chetan Bhatt, Sukhwant 
Dhaliwal and Rebecca Durand.  Ultimate responsibility for the opinions expressed resides 
with the authors. 
 
ii The group CAGE, formerly ‘Cageprisoners’ were founded in 2003.  The group’s 
outreach director is Moazzam Begg, a former Guantánamo Bay detainee who was 
released without charge in 2005. The group describe themselves on their website as ‘an 
independent grassroots organisation striving for a world free of injustice and oppression. 
We campaign against discriminatory state policies and advocate for due process and the 
rule of law’ (https://www.cage.ngo/about-us).  This is a description accepted at face 
value by many, while others would argue that these claims are rendered at the very 
least problematic by the way they have persistently sought to lend legitimacy to the 
work of violent salafi-jihadist spokespeople.  For example the Al Qaeda leader Anwar Al-
Awlaki, who inspired the Newham student Roshonara Choudhury discussed in this 
article, was live streamed into their conference from Yemen at the Wandsworth Civic 
Centre in London in 2008, a time at which there was evidence of his involvement in 
murders, kidnappings as well being wanted for possible involvement in the 9/11 
bombings. 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20100105040107/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukn
ews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6924653/Detroit-bombers-mentor-continues-to-influence-
British-mosques-and-universities.html) 
 
iii Hegghammer characterises the most politically substantial characteristics of salafi-
jihadists as being that they are ‘more extremist and intransigent than other [Salafist] 
groups’, and that while all Salafists draw on the Salafi or Wahhabi religious tradition, 
salafi-jihadists ‘are more internationalist and anti-Western than other groups.’ (2009, 
pp.253-254) 
 
iv Shiraz Maher, who is Deputy Director of the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation at John Hopkins University in the US, is the sort of individual Kundnani is 
criticising.  However, Maher’s work on salafi-jihadism (Maher, 2018) does offer insightful 
analysis of the politics of salafi-jihadism which should not be dismissed out of hand. 
Indeed, as Maher has made clear, his interest in these groups stems from his own 
involvement with Islamist groups.  As a young man, Maher was a member of the Islamist 
group Hizb ut-Tahrir but after the 2005 London bombings he left the organisation and 
became dedicated to opposing violent political Islamism, a journey he described on a BBC 
Panorama programme in 2007 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/7016299.stm). While the rejection 
of Islamist movements by former members does allow the nature of these groups to be 
exposed, what seems most problematic to us is the way Maher has travelled from Islamist 
to uncritical supporter of the US and Israel (see Cronin, 2013). One might speculate as to 
whether this reveals something of the ‘all-or-nothing’ mentality which draws individuals 
toward fundamentalist explanations in the first place. 
 
v Rahimi and Graumans make the point that much of the radicalisation literature 
understands this process in a highly decontextualised way: ‘Radicalisation…always needs 
to be contextualised, understood, measured in relation to the cultural, social and political 
context in which it is studied’ (2015, p.47). This point is not dissimilar to Kundnani’s 
critique but this point is made without the dismissal of this entire body of work.   
 
vi Within Roshonara Choudhury’s transcript of interview after the attempted murder of 
Stephen Timms she described an earlier visit to the UK Parliament in which a classmate 
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did explicitly criticise MPs over the Iraq War.   Rather than being supportive of these 
actions, Choudhury describes her reaction as one of embarrassment, wishing the 
classmate would stop (McDonald, 2013:158).  This points to the way - contra Kundnani – 
that rather than expressing social concerns about ‘racism, poverty and Empire’, 
radicalisation is as Khosrokhavar argues, highly narcissistic in that it is the ‘martyr’ 
themselves, rather than social struggles, that occupy centre stage (cited in McDonald, 
2013:183).   
vii Rahimi and Graumans argue that ‘In Muslim contexts, online communities take on 
special significance as they relate to the central Islamic notion of ‘ummah’, which denotes 
an abstract, transnational “community” of all Muslims around the globe…With new 
developments in technologies of information and communication ‘ummah’ has assumed 
brand new significance (e.g. Roy, 2010, 2014).  In Spalek and Imtoual’s (2007) words, 
‘[Islamic] militants now join an “imagined community” that works through minds attitudes 
and discourses rather than geographic locales or through social and family ties” (p.194). 
This increasingly important “community’ born of an exceptional convergence between 
traditional ideology and postmodern technology, however, has rarely been the topic of 
research’ (2015, p.43) 
 
viii In relation to this it is revealing to note the results of FBI surveillance of the US born Al-
Awlaki during the years when they were closely monitoring his movements, which 
revealed that he frequently visited prostitutes and that the FBI were seriously considering 
a criminal prosecution of him on this basis (New York Times, 27/8/2015). 
 
ix The Centre of Feminist Foreign Policy has reinforced this with regard to the politics of 
ISIS specifically: ‘Daesh differs from its jihadist predecessors in its intent to establish a 
caliphate. As such, Daesh has made the recruitment of women a priority, essential to its 
long-term state-building goals. After all, states not only need men to fight and establish a 
caliphate but also need women to sustain it and raise the next generation. Thus, women 
are needed as wives and mothers who will form the foundation of a stable society. These 
women are not simply short-term homemakers; they are long-term state builders. 
Fertility, then, is of prime importance to the group, and to this end, the protection of 
women is paramount. The fertility of a population is dependent on its number of women, 
not men. Thus, men are more expendable than women. Excluding women from 
participating in direct combat roles ensures their physical security, furthering the long-
term capacity of the caliphate. In the aim of establishing a state, Daesh must distinguish 
between in-group women, who are needed to preserve the state, and out-group women, 
who symbolize the same long-term capability of the enemy. Scholars have theorized that 
the widespread use of rape in times of conflict is a tactic used to traumatize and 
destabilize one’s enemy at the community and familial level. Targeting enemy women and 
sanctioning systematic rape and enslavement not only devastates enemy populations, but 
also serves to attract and maintain male Daesh fighters with promises of “spoils of war.” 
https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/journal/2017/1/17/women-as-victims-and-
perpetrators-of-daesh-violence 
 
x A recent example which CAGE have placed on the internet refers to social work very 
specifically. In this video, we see a woman ‘Sister Maryam’ who alleges that in 2016 
‘Prevent’ brought about the removal of her children – and alleges that there was no 
reason for the removal of these children other than that fact that ‘we are Muslims’ 
(https://www.facebook.com/CageUK/videos/1691457434201090/). Not only is it illegal 
for the police or social workers to remove children purely on the basis that the families 
are Muslims, but neither is Prevent part of the legal framework which relates to the 
removal of children. It may be that there was a specific safeguarding concern here, but 
one will not discover that from watching this video. This form of deliberately misleading 
material continues to be highly influential on the internet and is often shared and 
supported by people on the Left.  
